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INTRODUCTION 
Law is not justice and a trial is not a scientific inquiry into truth. 
A trial is the resolution of a dispute.—Edison Haines 
The real secret of magic lies in the performance.—David Copperfield 
A. Overview 
Trials, those oft long, theatrical, highly contentious happenings in court-
rooms are intended to resolve disputes. Certainly, in civil matters how one de-
fines a successful resolution is frequently biased as to the party defining the 
term. Regardless of how one defines it, the common denominator in any dis-
pute is that both sides seek to win. 
Edison Haines’s quote above is telling. Each party desires to have a dispute 
resolved, and resolved in the manner they desire. So how does one win? Truth 
may, or may not, have some role in the matter. Commonly, one or both sides 
employ legal representation to assist them. In addition to the traditional skills 
employed by lawyers, many share the skillsets utilized for hundreds of years by 
entertainers that we know as magicians. But unlike magicians, the courtroom is 
the venue for their performances. 
Misdirection, misinformation, selective attention, ambiguity, verbal ma-
nipulation, body language interpretation, and physical manipulation are all 
basic skills practiced, honed, and employed by magicians. Many of these tech-
niques have been equally mastered by some of the greatest trial lawyers in their 
constant quest to win. 
B. A Matter of Perspective 
In 1917, Harry Houdini performed a single, yet incredible, illusion: 
“[u]nder the bright spotlights of New York’s Theatre Hippodrome, he made a 
live elephant disappear.”1 In 1983 David Copperfield made the Statue of Liber-
ty disappear in front of both a live and a national television audience.2 To be 
                                                        
1  Jim Steinmeyer, Newsletter - Summer 2003, JIMSTEINMEYER.COM, http://www 
.jimsteinmeyer.com/newsletter/archive/summer03.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
2  IAN O. ANGELL & DIONYSIOS S. DEMETIS, SCIENCE’S FIRST MISTAKE: DELUSIONS IN 
PURSUIT OF THEORY 44 (2010); Curt Low, The Magic of David Copperfield V: Vanishing  
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sure, neither the elephant nor Lady Liberty actually disappeared. But from the 
perspective of the audience they did, indeed, disappear. So which is correct? 
Did they, or did they not? 
Consider this courtroom scenario: A witness testifies that on a particular 
evening she observed the defendant driving a red Chevrolet Corvette on Ham-
mond Street at approximately seven o’clock in the evening. A number of fac-
tors impact the accuracy of this testimony;3 in fact, her testimony may be com-
pletely inaccurate. Assume, for a moment, that the witness is completely 
wrong. Also assume that the fact finder believes the witness to be one hundred 
percent correct. So, was the defendant driving a Corvette on Hammond Street 
or was he not? Your answer should most certainly be that he was not. But for 
the purposes of the trial, the defendant was driving the Corvette on the date and 
at the time and place as testified to by the witness. The real truth may be some-
thing completely different. But for the purposes of that trial, what the fact find-
er believes is the “reality” for that particular situation. What actually occurred 
may or may not be reflected in the testimony and may never be brought out at 
trial. Alternatively, the truth may be brought out but not believed by the fact 
finder. 
So what about Houdini’s elephant or Copperfield’s Statue of Liberty? Log-
ic tells us that the neither the elephant nor the Statue could disappear. But from 
the perspective of the audience, at each of those moments, on each of those 
days, both the elephant and Lady Liberty vanished. Completely disappeared. 
Did they disappear? A trial is substantially similar in that the perspective of the 
audience (judge or jury) is what matters. The only real difference is that after a 
demonstration of an illusion, the audience “dismisses” the idea that magic hap-
pened; in a courtroom, the goal is to grasp onto facts that can be believed as re-
al. Audiences in a magic show know they have been fooled and recognize that 
their being fooled is part of the entertainment. A trial is not entertainment. In a 
trial, the fact finders may be fooled (intentionally or unintentionally) but are not 
left with the idea that what has been conveyed is impossible. If the fact finders 
believe that a particular piece of evidence was impossible then they will dis-
miss that evidence as untrue. 
Returning to the Corvette. The defendant may have never driven on Ham-
mond Street in his entire life. He may testify to that fact. He may introduce evi-
dence that supports his claim. But in the end, if the judge or jury believes that 
he was driving the Corvette on Hammond Street on that particular evening, 
                                                                                                                                
the Statue of Liberty (1983) (With Morgan Fairchild), YOUTUBE (Sept. 8, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wt2JbtqF3yo. 
3  Factors which may impact the testimony include: perception, memory, narration, and in-
tegrity. By way of example, the witness may have thought he saw the defendant but in fact 
saw someone else. The same problem could apply to the color of the vehicle. As to memory, 
the witness may recall seeing a Corvette but on that particular occasion saw a different car. 
As to narration, the witness may testify as to 7:00 p.m. but in fact the time was 5:00 p.m. Fi-
nally, the witness may simply be dishonest and intend to deceive the court. 
Spring 2015] MAGICIAN TECHNIQUES USED AT TRIAL 635 
then the truth for the purposes of that trial is that he was driving the car on that 
date and at that time. 
At the end of a trial, when all of the evidence has been presented, the only 
thing that matters is what the fact finder(s) believe to be true. For them (judge 
or jury), the reality of the dispute before them lies in what they believe to be 
true and dismiss as untrue. It is the perspective of the fact finder that becomes 
the truth. And this point is where the skills of a trial lawyer and the skills of a 
magician dovetail. 
The motivation of the trial lawyer and the magician are shared; they seek to 
influence, impact, and, in some cases, alter the perspectives of their respective 
audiences. And many of the tools and techniques used by both lawyer and ma-
gician are the same. This article examines some of those skills. 
C. The Playbill 
Act I: The Opener provides a brief overview of the common tools used by 
lawyers (and magicians) and discusses how they manifest themselves in the 
courtroom. Act II: Misdirection examines the various forms of misdirection in-
cluding verbal misdirection, the use of personal connections, word choice, and 
directed focus. Act III: Misinformation examines how the use of misinfor-
mation plays into responses with regard to inaccurate input, false memories, 
and a lack of shared meaning of vocabulary. The Intermission discusses how 
the Federal Rules of Evidence may impact some of these tools. Act IV: Digging 
Deeper delves a bit deeper into the techniques of the choice of words4 with a 
detailed look at grammatical tools such as the choices related to verbs, modifi-
ers, articles, adjectives, adverbs, and phrases. Act V: Possible Countermeasures 
suggests possible solutions that may help combat these various manipulative 
techniques. The Curtain Call summarizes everything. 
ACT I: THE OPENER 
If you look up “charming” in the dictionary, you’ll see that it not only has ref-
erences to strong attraction, but to spells and magic. Then again, what are li-
ars if not great magicians?—Deb Caletti 
Lawyers use many techniques in trial, but the primary tool is the use of 
words. Although lawyers use demonstrative evidence, video, graphics, comput-
er simulations, and the like, the most fundamental tool is the use of words. 
Courtrooms provide a number of opportunities for which lawyers may demon-
                                                        
4  Although the scope of this article is limited to an examination of the impact on responses, 
other research has evaluated the impact of questions on juries and their perceptions. See, e.g., 
Saul M. Kassin, The American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 
687 (1990); Saul M. Kassin et al., Dirty Tricks of Cross Examination: The Influence of Con-
jectural Evidence on the Jury, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 373 (1990); John C. Reinard & Darin 
J. Arsenault, The Impact of Forms of Strategic and Non-Strategic Voir Dire Questions on 
Jury Verdicts, 67 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 158 (2000). 
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strate their oratory skills. Voir dire, opening statements, direct and cross-
examination, and closing statements all provide ample opportunity to exercise 
and hone their abilities to effectively use words. Additionally, trials often pro-
vide opportunities for the use of objections, responses to objections, motions, 
and arguments to exercise the lawyer’s craft. Couple those tools with appear-
ance, body language, and physical manipulation of their surroundings and the 
trial lawyer’s effectiveness is enhanced. Words come in many forms but the tri-
al lawyer’s most crucial skill set is how he or she uses words in a court of law 
when asking questions. 
It is uncanny how many techniques lawyers share with the performing arts 
and, in particular, with magicians. Magicians use psychological techniques 
such as misdirection, intentional focus, and ambiguity to manipulate their audi-
ence. Lawyers use these techniques and their psychological effect on persons to 
manipulate witnesses and, ultimately, the fact finder. These techniques, such as 
misdirection, are folded into their arguments, their examination of witnesses, 
and the like in an effort to impact the ultimate result. That is, to win. 
ACT II: MISDIRECTION 
If I were a magician, I’d hand out broken compasses. 
It’s all about misdirection.—Jarod Kintz 
A. Generally 
By far, one of the most common and effective tools among magicians and 
lawyers alike is misdirection. In People v. Simpson, the defendant, O.J. Simp-
son, was being tried for the murder of his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and 
her boyfriend, Ronald Goldman.5 On January 24, 1995, opening statements be-
gan in the murder trial.6 A little more than eight months later, the trial conclud-
ed with a verdict on October 3, 1995.7 And yet, after months of oral testimony, 
numerous fact witnesses, multiple expert witnesses, and countless pieces of 
tangible evidence, the most famous takeaway from the case and one of the most 
frequently recalled quotes, was uttered by the famed attorney Johnnie 
Cochran.8 As part of his closing statement, Mr. Cochran referred back to O.J. 
Simpson’s attempt to try on leather gloves found at the crime scene and deliv-
ered these lines: 
                                                        
5  Douglas O. Linder, The Trial of Orenthal James Simpson, FAMOUS AM. TRIALS:  
THE O.J. SIMPSON TRIAL 1995 (2000), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/simpson 
/simpsonaccount.htm. 
6  Key Dates in the O.J. Simpson Case, CNN (Feb. 5, 1997), http://www.cnn.com/US/9702 
/05/oj.timeline/. 
7  Id. 
8  The Associated Press, Johnnie Cochran, Famed Defense Lawyer, Is Dead at 67, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/29/national/29wire-cochran.html. 
Johnnie Cochran, a famous trial lawyer born in 1937, took a number of highly publicized 
cases including the Simpson case and passed away in 2005. Id. 
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I want you to remember these words. Like the defining moment in this trial, the 
day Mr. Darden asked Mr. Simpson to try on those gloves and the gloves didn’t 
fit, remember these words; if it doesn’t fit, you must acquit.9 
And those words were remembered; the jury, America, virtually everyone who 
remembers the trial remembers those words. The jury’s final decision was an 
acquittal of all charges. 
10
Mr. Cochran’s famous quote came as a result from the demonstration re-
quested by the prosecutor. At the request of Mr. Darden, the court required Mr. 
Simpson to try on the now famous bloody gloves.11 However, in an effort not to 
contaminate the evidence, Mr. Simpson had to put latex gloves over his hands 
before trying on the leather gloves.12 So the scene is set. Mr. Simpson must 
now slide leather gloves over latex gloves. As is well known, trying to slide an-
ything over latex is virtually impossible. Because of the friction between the 
gloves in evidence and the latex, that task is incredibly difficult (if not impossi-
ble) regardless of whether or not the gloves fit the hand. 
The result was a glove that did not quite fit and the famous line Cochran 
uttered: “if it doesn’t fit, you must acquit.”13 This brief demonstration did not 
prove the defendant’s innocence. Rather, it was misdirection; it was theater; it 
was performance. And it worked. 
                
9 Closing Argument of Johnnie Cochran (Excerpts), FAMOUS AM. TRIALS: THE O.J. SIMPSON 
TRIAL 1995 (2000), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Simpson/cochranclose.html 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
10 Was Evidence Manipulated in O.J. Simpson Trial?, FOX NEWS (Sept. 10, 2012), 
http://video.foxnews.com/v/1832719190001/was-evidence-manipulated-in-oj-simpson-trial/. 
11 Colleen Curry, 10 Classic Images That Explain the O.J. Simpson Trial, ABC NEWS  
(June 12, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US/10-images-explain-oj-simpson-trial/story?id= 
24058030. 
12 Id. 
13 Closing Argument of Johnnie Cochran (Excerpts), supra note 9. 
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Cochran directed the jury’s attention away from numerous pieces of damn-
ing evidence and focused their attention on something they could grasp onto—
something tangible and seemingly real. He effectively moved their focus from 
evidence that is incriminating to that which raises doubt. More importantly, that 
particular demonstration was not reflective of whether or not the gloves fit be-
cause the gloves were not put on his bare hands. This was misdirection at its 
finest. Did the gloves fit? We will likely never know. But the jurors’ perception 
was reality for that trial. For purposes of People v. Simpson, the truth was that 
the gloves did not fit.14 The elephant had vanished. 
Misdirection can appear in many forms and the judicial system is rife with 
examples. In a recent case out of the State of Georgia, a father was charged 
with murder—accused of intentionally leaving his twenty-two-month-old son 
in a hot car to die.15 During the preliminary hearing, the prosecution asked 
questions which included allegations that during the day the child died, the fa-
ther was trading text messages with various women.16 It was further alleged 
that at least one of these women was under the age of eighteen.17 If the defend-
ant was, in fact, trading these text messages, the fact that he did so raises a 
number of serious concerns. If he did so while intentionally leaving his son to 
die in a hot car he arguably has some sort of psychopathy. But did those allega-
tions have any relevance to the matter before the court? 
The purpose of the hearing was to determine whether there was enough ev-
idence for the case to go to a grand jury.18 Did the allegations of sexual text 
messages add to the relevant evidence? Did the allegation that one of the fe-
males was under the age of eighteen add to the relevant evidence? Certainly the 
judge thought so. These allegations, while problematic for many reasons and 
highly inflammatory, had nothing to do with the purpose of the court proceed-
ing.19 This was a classic case of misdirection; raise something ugly, something 
offensive, and something that no one could justify, and which can easily be 
proved. Was this relevant to the murder charges? No. But the judge, who in this 
case was also the fact finder, admitted evidence that had nothing to do with 
what he was there to decide. The prosecutor used the techniques of a magi-
cian—misdirection. The judge was looking at the inflammatory evidence and, 
                                                        
14  Linder, supra note 5. 
15  David Beasley, Georgia Man Charged with Murder of Son in Hot Car to Remain  
Jailed, YAHOO NEWS (July 3, 2014, 6:21 PM), https://news.yahoo.com/georgia-father-ac 
cused-sons-death-hot-car-due-171728373.html. 
16  Carol Robinson, Justin Ross Harris Hearing Includes Underage Sexting Allegations, Wit-
nesses Calling Him a Great Dad, AL.COM NEWS (July 3, 2014, 5:50 PM), 
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2014/07/justin_ross_harris_hearing_bri.html. Specifical-
ly, the allegations were that the defendant was trading text message that were sexual in na-
ture (sexting) and one of the women was only sixteen years old. Id. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. 
19  The prosecution argued that these allegations were evidence of motive. Id. That connec-
tion, at best, is weak. Even if true, the inflammatory nature seriously outweighs any proba-
tive value they might have. 
Spring 2015] MAGICIAN TECHNIQUES USED AT TRIAL 639 
therefore, not necessarily looking at the evidence relevant to what he was 
charged with the decision to make. The prosecutor focused the judge on those 
terrible facts. The result? The case was referred to a grand jury.20 
B. Making Connections 
Misdirection can manifest itself in many forms. Steinmeyer notes that part 
of “[t]he success of the magician lies in making a human connection to the 
magic.”21 The lawyer shares the same challenge. The need to make a connec-
tion, at some level, in some regard, with what he or she is trying to prove is also 
incredibly important. Lawyers and magicians share a common tool—they make 
connections with people. 
One technique used to make those connections is human touch. Lawyers 
use human touch in the courtroom for similar motives as to those who use it out 
of the courtroom. Human touch impacts peoples’ perceptions and connections. 
A waiter or waitress may touch you on the shoulder at some point while 
serving you. This action is intended to make a connection for the purpose of 
increasing tips.22 That personal touch (pun intended) helps create that connec-
tion. Why do they call you by name (when they can)? More personal connec-
tion which leads to higher tips.23 Wait staff capitalize on the fact that if they can 
connect with you then you will tip higher, and they are correct.24 
The famous magician Howard Thurston was known for making personal 
connections, sometimes in unique ways. As an example, when performing the 
rising card trick where a chosen playing card is lost in the middle of a deck 
(usually located in a wooden houlette located center stage) and then magically 
rises, he would select a “little boy in the audience [who] was urged to stand on 
his theatre seat and pull his father’s hair to make the cards rise.”25 The connec-
tion (little boy, father, audience, magic trick) makes the illusion. It is no longer 
simply a card rising out of a deck. It is an effect that draws the entire audience 
into the moment: the boy pulling his father’s hair at precisely the same time the 
card was rising from the center of the deck on the stage. 
                                                        
20  Id. To be fair, the case had a number of bad facts and most likely would have been re-
ferred to a grand jury even if the evidence of the text messages and underage female were 
not considered. It was reported that the evidence included internet searches relating to child 
deaths in hot cars, how to survive in prison, and visits to a website that advocates not having 
children. Id. All of this is relevant and certainly damaging to the defendant. Why then were 
the text messages necessary? Because lawyers do not like to lose and they will use every tool 
at their disposal to obtain the outcome they seek—even misdirection. 
21  JIM STEINMEYER, HIDING THE ELEPHANT: HOW MAGICIANS INVENTED THE IMPOSSIBLE AND 
LEARNED TO DISAPPEAR 17 (2003). 
22  MICHAEL LYNN, MEGA TIPS: SCIENTIFICALLY TESTED TECHNIQUES TO INCREASE YOUR 
TIPS (2004), available at http://www.tipping.org/tips/megatips.pdf. Dr. Lynn is an Associate 
Professor at the School of Hotel Administration at Cornell University. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. 
25  STEINMEYER, supra note 21, at 14. 
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The contrast to simply performing the effect on the stage without the con-
nection to the audience is stark. In the former example, the audience connects 
with the boy and his pulling of the father’s hair and how in that very moment 
magic is made and experienced by everyone in the audience. The connection 
brings everyone together at the same time for the same reason to experience the 
same illusion. When there is no connection, the conjurer says a few magic 
words and up comes the card. These connections, although theatrical and hav-
ing no technical impact on the magic effect, are exactly like those employed by 
the trial lawyer. 
Lawyers make connections too, and necessary ones. Whether in front of a 
judge or jury, lawyers capitalize on factors they believe will help them win. 
Take jury selection,26 for example. A lawyer will often use the names of 
individual jurors during voir dire in an attempt to connect with the members. 
During the voir dire process, lawyers attempt to learn biases and perspectives 
of prospective members in an effort to strike those potential members that have 
biases that work against their client and seat members that have biases that 
work for their client.27 This attempt to establish a connection can be critical. If 
                                                        
26  Although commonly used, the term “jury selection” is technically inaccurate as juries are 
not selected. Sitting juries usually result from a pool of potential jury members that are 
“struck” whether for cause or not. So technically one “strikes” a jury, one does not “select” a 
jury. 
27  Officially, the purpose of voir dire is explained a bit differently. According to the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, voir dire is explained this way: 
To begin a jury trial, a panel of prospective jurors is called into the courtroom. This panel 
will include a number of persons from whom a jury will be selected to try the case. Alternate ju-
rors may be chosen to take the place of jurors who become ill during the trial. 
The panel members are sworn to answer questions about their qualifications to sit as jurors 
in the case. This questioning process is called the voir dire. This is an examination conducted by 
the judge and sometimes includes participation by counsel. A deliberately untruthful answer to 
any fair question could result in serious punishment to the person making it. 
The voir dire examination opens with a short statement about the case. The purpose is to 
inform the jurors of what the case is about and to identify the parties and their lawyers. 
Questions are then asked to find out whether any individuals on the panel have any person-
al interest in the case or know of any reason why they cannot render an impartial verdict. The 
court also wants to know whether any member of the panel is related to or personally acquainted 
with the parties, their lawyers, or the witnesses who will appear during trial. Other questions will 
determine whether any panel members have a prejudice or a feeling that might influence them in 
rendering a verdict. Any juror having knowledge of the case should explain this to the judge. 
Parties on either side may ask that a member of the panel be excused or exempted from 
service on a particular jury. These requests, or demands, are called challenges. 
A person may be challenged for cause if the examination shows he or she might be preju-
diced. The judge will excuse an individual from the panel if the cause raised in the challenge is 
sufficient. There is no limit to the number of challenges for cause which either party may make. 
The parties also have a right to a certain number of challenges for which no cause is neces-
sary. These are called peremptory challenges. Each side usually has a predetermined number of 
peremptory challenges. The peremptory challenge is a legal right long recognized by law as a 
means of giving both sides some choice in the make-up of a jury. Jurors should clearly under-
stand that being eliminated from the jury panel by a peremptory challenge is no reflection upon 
their ability or integrity. 
In some courts the peremptory challenges are made openly in the hearing of the jury. In 
others, they are made from the jury list out of the jury’s sight. 
Handbook for Trial Jurors: The Voir Dire Examination, U.S. DISTRICT CT.: S. DISTRICT 
Spring 2015] MAGICIAN TECHNIQUES USED AT TRIAL 641 
a jury member connects with the lawyer, the lawyer will try to use that to the 
benefit of his client. This tool can be quite effective in, for example, a criminal 
trial. 
Suppose lawyer Jones is representing criminal defendant Smith for assault. 
Jones attempts to make a connection with members of the jury during voir dire. 
Then, during the course of the trial, Jones creates a physical connection with 
Smith during the trial at various times. For example, when questioning a wit-
ness that discusses Smith’s character, Jones may walk behind Smith and put his 
hands on Smith’s shoulders. When conferencing with Smith, Jones may put his 
arm around Smith bringing him in close to Jones. Why? The desire is to make 
the jurors transfer their “connection” with Jones to Smith. It is an effort to hu-
manize Smith. Surely, if Smith were such a bad guy Jones wouldn’t be so 
friendly toward him. Notice that the concept of evidence is completely lacking 
from this discussion? These connections are, in a sense, another form of misdi-
rection. Does it work? 
Consider the discussion of a waiter’s tips above. While we don’t have spe-
cific studies on the use of human touch during courtroom trials, there is evi-
dence that supports the proposition that human touch makes a difference. Dr. 
Michael Lynn posits that: 
Touching is a powerful form of interpersonal behavior that can communi-
cate affection, appreciation, aggression, dominance, social support, or other 
meanings depending on the context in which it occurs. In commercial settings, 
casually touching customers has been shown to increase the time they spend 
shopping in a store, the amounts that they purchase, and the favorability of their 
store evaluations. These positive effects suggest that being touched may also in-
crease the tips that customers leave their servers. 
[Two researchers] tested this possibility at two restaurants in Oxford, Mis-
sissippi. Three waitresses . . . randomly assigned their customers to one of three 
touch conditions. Customers either were not touched, were casually touched on 
the shoulder once for about one and a half seconds, or were casually touched on 
the palm of the hand twice for about half a second each time. All touches oc-
curred as the waitresses returned change to their customers at the end of the 
meal. Eye contact was avoided during this process. 
The effects of the touch manipulation were significant. Customers left an 
average tip of 12% when they were not touched as compared to 14% when they 
were touched once on the shoulder and 17% when they were touched twice on 
the palm of the hand. Subsequent research conducted by various other research-
ers has demonstrated that: (1) casually touching customers increases the tips of 
both male and female servers, (2) touching increases tips more when waitresses 
touch the female members of mixed-sex dining parties than when they touch the 
male members of those dining parties, and (3) touching increases the tips of 
young customers more than those of older customers.28 
                                                                                                                                
N.Y., http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/jury_handbook.php?id=6 (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) 
(emphases omitted). 
28  LYNN, supra note 22. 
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It appears that in some contexts human touch can make a difference. Does 
that translate to positive results in the courtroom? Without a study we will like-
ly not know with certainty, but what we do know is that lawyers use the tech-
nique. 
In People v. Simpson,29 there were numerous examples of O.J.’s lawyers 
touching him. In the trial of State v. Zimmerman,30 there were numerous in-
stances of the defendant’s lawyers touching him. In State v. Anthony,31 there 
were many instances where Anthony’s lawyer put his hand on Anthony’s 
shoulder or moved well within her personal space. Although these particular 
examples are of well publicized cases, they simply highlight the practice of 
successful trial lawyers. All three cases resulted in acquittals.32 
So how does the creation of a personal connection equate to misdirection? 
The answer lies in the answer to another question. What do personal connec-
tions have to do with admissible evidence? Generally, nothing. Whether a per-
son is likeable, whether a person connects in some way with another, has noth-
ing to do with whether or not the facts support or oppose what is attempting to 
be proved in a court of law. Even though a juror may “connect” with a defend-
ant, such connection does not mean the defendant is not lying on the witness 
stand. So why do lawyers seek to make personal connections? Misdirection. 
The jury member may be more likely to believe the defendant if there is a con-
nection between the two. 
Although connections are one factor that impacts a judge or jury, the pri-
mary form of communication, and the primary tool of the trial lawyer, is the 
use of the spoken language. 
C. The Impact of the Words on the Listener 
Words chosen by the speaker can have a significant impact on the listener. 
Both magicians and lawyers impact the listener through the use of the spoken 
word. Attorneys impact the listener primarily through questions. As noted trial 
consultant Kelly Kellerman pointed out, “[q]uestions do more than ask: they 
solicit and convey information, and focus and suggest answers. By influencing 
answers, questions alter what is understood by others.”33 
                                                        
29  People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 1995). 
30  State v. Zimmerman, No. 12.CF.1083.A (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2013). 
31  State v. Anthony, No. 48-2008.CF.015606-O (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2011). 
32  This is not to imply, in any way, that touching a defendant on the shoulder or other forms 
of personal contact will result in an acquittal. This is also not to imply that the personal con-
tact was the reason for the acquittal in these cases. However, it does demonstrate that this 
technique is used by lawyers and may contribute to the success of the trial. Personal connec-
tion, such as touch, is merely one of the many tools used by lawyers. 
33  KATHY KELLERMANN, PERSUASIVE QUESTION-ASKING: HOW QUESTION WORDING 
INFLUENCES ANSWERS 1 (2007), available at http://www.kkcomcon.com/doc/KPQA.pdf. 
Kellermann is a trial consultant. 
Spring 2015] MAGICIAN TECHNIQUES USED AT TRIAL 643 
Lawyers are wordsmiths. It is not just the words they use but also the way 
in which they use them. Consider Jim Steinmeyer’s explanation of the skills of 
a magician: 
[T]here are few secrets that [magicians] possess that are beyond the capacity of a 
high-school science class, little technology more complex than a rubber band, a 
square of mirrored glass, or a length of thread. . . .  
The real art is how the rubber band is handled with the finesse of a jewel 
cutter, how a mirror is used or concealed precisely, how a masterful performer 
can hint at impossibilities that are consummated with only a piece of thread. . . .  
. . . The audience is taken by the hand and led to deceive themselves.34 
Lawyers often have extensive vocabularies. However, it is not the posses-
sion of the words that makes the lawyer effective; rather, like the magician, it is 
how the lawyer wields the words. 
The fundamental premise in verbal misdirection is that the accuracy of an-
swers will be impacted by the question posed. If an answer to a question is in-
fluenced, in part, on the words, structure, intonation, dialect, or speed used to 
form the question, then the one posing the question can manipulate the answer. 
The most basic means to influence an answer is the use of words in crafting the 
questions. 
Words used to formulate a question may impact answers to questions in 
four ways. First, the wording of a question “put[s] different words in an-
swerers’ mouths.”35 Second, that “[q]uestions frame acceptable answers, sug-
gesting some and excluding others.”36 These questions many manifest them-
selves in leading questions or direct questions. Third, “[q]uestions carry 
assumptions that influence answers.”37 And finally, “[a] question’s form influ-
ences answers by inviting agreement or disagreement, openness or evasion, and 
threat or comfort.”38 
Each of these four influences can merge with leading questions. Leading 
questions, by definition, suggest the answer.39 Therefore, the first method ex-
pressed by Ms. Kellerman is fundamentally a restatement of the definition of a 
leading question (putting words in the answerer’s mouth). The second method 
might not seem reflective of a leading question (using the question to frame the 
answer). Certainly, depending upon the choices given, it might not be. A ques-
tion such as “Did it occur during the day or in the evening?” is not a leading 
question, yet would fit within Ms. Kellerman’s second paradigm. Alternatively, 
a question such as “Was the car blue or green?” is extremely suggestive as it 
                                                        
34  STEINMEYER, supra note 21, at 16–17. 
35  KELLERMANN, supra note 33, at 3. 
36  Id. at 2. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 3. 
39  Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “leading question” as “[a] question that suggests the 
answer to the person being interrogated; esp., a question that may be answered by a mere 
‘yes’ or ‘no.’ ” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (10th ed. 2014). 
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eliminates all of the other colors as choices. Although the respondent has a 
choice of two colors, she is not provided with any other color choices such as 
yellow, or red, or white, et cetera. In that regard, framing the question by limit-
ing the choices is, in a sense, leading. The third method is often built into lead-
ing questions (a question that carries with it assumptions). For example, “Did 
you hit your wife after you screamed at her?” builds in the premise that the re-
sponding party screamed at his wife. It is a simple example but many questions 
build in a premise in an effort to create a fact that is not, or cannot easily, be 
disputed. And lastly, at least with regard to cross-examination, virtually all 
questions meet the final criteria (inviting agreement or disagreement, openness 
or evasion, and threat or comfort). In fact, the best questions leave the respond-
ing party with only a “yes” or a “no” as acceptable responses. At times, ques-
tions may inadvertently mislead the person answering the question which, in 
turn, may mislead the fact finder. 
D. Poor Listeners 
Many factors may cause a responding party to be misled. One is that listen-
ers are often poor or passive listeners. Oftentimes a listener may be confused 
by, or simply may not be paying close enough attention to, a question and/or 
the subsequent answer. “In one study, mock jurors listened to an excerpt of tes-
timony and indicated whether certain statements were true or false. After hear-
ing the statement, ‘I ran up to the burglar alarm,’ for example, most subjects 
recalled that the witness had said, ‘I rang the burglar alarm.’ ”40 The author of 
the study surmises that people may “process information between the lines and 
assume they heard what was only implied.”41 
Generally people are often passive listeners and, as a result, do not accu-
rately hear questions. The problem of inaccurate or poor listening can certainly 
be enhanced or exacerbated by the stress of the setting of the courtroom, the 
length of the trial or hearing, the stakes of the controversy involved, the emo-
tional tax on the listener, et cetera. 
E. Framed to Evoke Emotion 
Ms. Kellerman’s final paradigm suggests that questions may influence an-
swers by “inviting agreement or disagreement, openness or evasion, and threat 
or comfort.”42 In some examples, the way in which word choice is used to 
frame questions can readily be seen to have a significant impact on answers. As 
an example, during the Vietnam War, two members of Congress conducted a 
poll with regard to President Johnson’s order in the late sixties to bomb Hanoi 
                                                        
40  Kassin, supra note 4, at 693. 
41  Id. 
42  KELLERMANN, supra note 33, at 3. 
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and Haiphong.43 One question used the following language: “Do you approve 
of the recent decision to extend bombing raids in North Vietnam aimed at the 
strategic supply depots around Hanoi and Haiphong?”44 The alternate question 
was crafted as follows: “Do you believe the U.S. should bomb Hanoi and Hai-
phong?”45 In the former question, the responder could—even if incorrect—
surmise the basis for the bombing thereby giving the responder more infor-
mation to make a determination. In the latter question, less information is given 
to the responder. This may lead to the response being based on a number of fac-
tors but, of significance, gives the responder no basis from which to surmise the 
reason for the bombing. When the language included the terms “strategic sup-
ply depots,” 65 percent of the Americans responding favored the decision.46 
But with the alternative wording, when the basis of the decision was omitted, 
only 14 percent favored the decision.47 Both questions sought identical infor-
mation and yet there was a 51 percent difference in the favorable responses. 
The difference is statistically significant. 
Under Kellerman’s different categories, the Vietnam questions likely fall 
under her fourth paradigm. That is, the first iteration of the question possibly 
invited comfort or a reason for agreement. The second question is less so. 
Lawyers often create scenarios utilizing select facts to craft questions in-
tended to target an answer. One could argue the question that simply asks for 
agreement or disagreement gives the responding party little information that, 
without more, makes him or her simply rely on existing knowledge which may 
be incomplete. The average responding party may not have any idea why Pres-
ident Johnson ordered the bombing. So, without more, the idea of bombing a 
city may sound terrible, or extreme to those responding, evoking emotions such 
as that of senseless death and destruction. But when additional information is 
added to the question, that additional information permits the responder to 
make a more informed choice. Remember that the information provided with 
the question may not be the entire story. That is, there may be countervailing 
facts that were intentionally left out. They may be left out in an effort to influ-
ence the responses. 
During the period of time from March 14 through March 15, 2003, Gallup 
conducted a poll that asked the following: “Would you favor or oppose invad-
ing Iraq with U.S. ground troops in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from 
power?”48 At that time, 64 percent of the respondents responded in the affirma-
                                                        
43  U.S. Planes Bomb North Vietnam, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-his 
tory/us-planes-bomb-north-vietnam (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
44  Sydney A. Beckman, Witness Response Manipulation Through Strategic “Non-Leading” 
Questions (or The Art of Getting the Desired Answer by Asking the Right Question), 43 Sw. 
U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2013). 
45  Id. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. 
48  Iraq, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
The Gallup poll actually rotated three variances of the question. 
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tive.49 Recall, at that time, the United States believed that there were weapons 
of mass destruction being created in Iraq.50 It was later determined that Iraq did 
not have the arsenal that it was initially thought to have.51 Although Gallup 
never administered a poll directly on point, it did administer a number of polls 
asking respondents whether or not it was a good idea to send troops to Iraq.52 
Of the eighty-four administrations of the poll from March 2003 to June 2014, 
not one of the polls reflected a positive outcome as high as the first administra-
tion before troops were deployed.53 Although a great deal of information plays 
into individual responses, particularly with a topic as highly charged as the Iraq 
invasion, the information framed in the question can significantly impact the 
responses. 
Approximately forty years ago, two researchers at the University of Wash-
ington conducted a study about words and their impact on responses.54 The 
study sought to determine whether the use of different verbs posed in questions 
about the speed of a vehicle would elicit different answers that were statistical-
ly significant.55 Applying this theory to trial lawyers, when asking questions by 
altering the simplest of words, the results may help influence a witness’s re-
sponse.56 The fact that the way questions are formed will impact the answers to 
those questions is clear.57 
In 1975, Kenneth Edelin was tried on a charge of manslaughter.58 In a 
study based on that case, terms were examined which were associated with the 
                                                        
49  Id. 
50  Full Text: Bush’s Speech: A Transcript of George Bush’s War Ultimatum Speech From 
the Cross Hall in the White House, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2003, 9:22 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq. 
51  Weapons of Mass Destruction: Iraq Survey Group Final Report, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/isg-final-
report_vol1_rsi-06.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
52  Iraq, supra note 48. 
53  Id. 
54  Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Ex-
ample of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING VERBAL 
BEHAV. 585 (1974). 
55  The abstract of the article summarizes the purpose of the study more fully: 
Two experiments are reported in which subjects viewed films of automobile accidents and 
then answered questions about events occurring in the films. The question, “About how fast 
were the cars going when they smashed into each other?” elicited higher estimates of speed than 
questions which used the verbs collided, bumped, contacted, or hit in place of smashed. On a re-
test one week later, those subjects who received the verb smashed were more likely to say “yes” 
to the question, “Did you see any broken glass?”, even though broken glass was not present in 
the film. These results are consistent with the view that the questions asked subsequent to an 
event can cause a reconstruction in one’s memory of that event. 
Id. at 585. 
56  Id. at 586. The study specifically addressed subsequent questions over a time-differential 
in an effort to address whether memory would fill in gaps. This too would have implications 
at trial but exceeds the scope of this article. 
57  KELLERMANN, supra note 33. 
58  Commonwealth v. Edelin, 359 N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1976). 
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victim, a twenty-four-week-old fetus.59 One concern surrounded the terminolo-
gy used at trial to reference a fetus. The prosecution wanted to personalize the 
victim while the defense sought the opposite. As noted by the author, “the 
charge of manslaughter, or any type of killing, quite naturally takes for granted 
that the victim was once alive.”60 One might think that the use of particular la-
bels might make little difference in the outcome. However, the defense counsel 
was so concerned with the use of language that he filed a motion “for an order 
to prevent use of the words ‘suffocate,’ ‘smother,’ ‘murder,’ ‘baby boy,’ and 
‘human being.’ ”61 The prosecution offered to use the term ‘male child’ instead 
of ‘baby boy,’ both of which were objected to by the defense counsel.62 Do 
these terms matter? That is, does the use of a particular term over another term 
impact how a jury deliberates? 
As discussed above, this author often posits that, in a court of law, the truth 
is what the judge or the jury believes regardless of whether their conclusion is 
based on what factually occurred. Words and the way words describe, charac-
terize, chronicle, depict, detail, explain, and inform are impacted by the words 
chosen. The words chosen are impacted by the rules and procedures of the judi-
cial system. As noted by Danet, the words “ ‘baby’ and ‘fetus’ are referentially 
more or less equivalent ways of talking about [the victim] but socially, they are 
miles apart.”63 
As noted by Danet, questioning in the adversary system, with its rules and 
procedures, results in a “reality” that is “constructed and negotiated in the 
courtroom.”64 And, she notes, the “outcome of questioning is as much a func-
tion of the verbal strategies and choices of the participants as it is of the sup-
posed ‘facts’ of the case.”65 Kassin points out that questions may mislead a jury 
(or fact finder) when “suggestive questions . . . produce support for . . . conjec-
ture by shaping the witness’s testimony.”66 
This conclusion bears out in a number of real world examples. One such 
example comes from the General Social Survey (“GSS”).67 Over an eighteen-
year period, the GSS asked the following questions: 
Question 1: Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on 
welfare? 
                                                        
59  Brenda Danet, ‘Baby’ or ‘Fetus’?: Language and the Construction of Reality in a Man-
slaughter Trial, 32 SEMIOTICA 187 (1980). In this article, the scientific method was not em-
ployed but rather transcripts of proceedings were merely evaluated and conclusions drawn 
from the analysis. 
60  Id. at 187. 
61  Id. at 188. 
62  Id. at 189. 
63  Id. at 191. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. at 192. 
66  Kassin, supra note 4, at 697. 
67  KELLERMANN, supra note 33, at 5. 
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Question 2: Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on 
assistance to the poor?68 
Table 1 shows how the same individuals responded to the questions in signifi-
cantly different ways. 
TABLE 1: DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSES TO PHRASING OF QUESTIONS POSED IN THE GSS 
Response Choice 
Question 1:  
“welfare” 
(pct. of responses) 
Question 2: 
“assistance to the poor” 
(pct. of responses) Difference 
Too Little 20% 64% + 44% 
About Right 33% 25% - 8% 
Too Much 47% 11% - 36% 
Although the questions asked essentially the same thing, when the question 
was worded using the term welfare, forty-four percent fewer respondents felt 
that too little was being spent than when the same respondents were asked 
about money being spent on the poor. The other responses reflect similar re-
sults; that is, the use of the phrase “assistance to the poor” which often invokes 
sympathy had substantially different results than used of the phrase “welfare” 
which typically does not. Dr. Reichardt rhetorically pondered whether “politi-
cians tend to use the word ‘assistance’ when they want to increase funding to 
the poor but [use] the word ‘welfare’ when they want to cut back on funding to 
the poor.”69 
In People v. Simpson, the defendant, O.J. Simpson, was being tried for the 
murder of his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson. In that case, much like the 
Edelin case, the opposing sides used significantly different words to describe 
identical events. For example, the defense “called domestic incidents that which 
the prosecution called wife beating and abuse.”70 Clearly, the former label is 
intended to sterilize the incidents while the latter is designed to evoke negative 
emotion towards the defendant. Strategically crafting questions, particularly 
with words that evoke emotion, which in turn manipulates answers, could sig-
nificantly impact trial results. 
F. Directed Focus 
Magicians and lawyers alike often provide the spectator specific instruc-
tions. It might be “cut this deck of cards in approximately equal halves,” or 
possibly, “think back to the night of the accident.” For magicians, oftentimes 
the instructions are designed to focus one’s attention on something so that 
something else will not be seen. For lawyers, the instructions frequently gener-
                                                        
68  Id. 
69  Charles S. Reichardt, Wording of Questions (2004) (unpublished manuscript) (quoted in 
Beckman, supra note 44, at 6). 
70  KELLERMANN, supra note 33, at 5. 
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ate a context for the answer. The result of these instructions is that a witness 
often has their focus directed by the lawyer. The impact may result in a skewed 
answer. 
For psychologists, this is similar to a phenomenon known as “inattentional 
blindness” or “selective attention.” Inattentional blindness has been defined as 
an event in which an individual fails to recognize an unexpected stimulus that 
is in plain sight.71 Although the concept of inattentional blindness refers to vis-
ual perception, the result is that the direction or instruction provided to the par-
ticipant results in the blindness of the individual. 
Inattentional blindness may be illustrated by a famous experiment known 
as the “invisible gorilla.”72 The experiment consisted of a video showing young 
people passing a basketball back and forth.73 Half of the participants were 
wearing white shirts and the other half of the participants were wearing black 
shirts. The directions which preceded the video instructed the viewer as fol-
lows: “Count how many times the players wearing white pass the basketball.”74 
While concentrating on the task of counting the passes, “most observers failed 
to notice a person wearing a gorilla suit walk across the scene (the gorilla even 
stops briefly at the centre of the scene and beats its chest!).”75 The researchers 
noted that it was not necessary to distract the observers in an effort to keep 
them from seeing the gorilla.76 The instruction to count the passes focused the 
attention of the observers on a specific task and, therefore, on those visual cues 
to assist them—e.g., the white shirts. The black shirts were ignored, as was the 
gorilla (also black), and this was coupled with the fact that one player was 
completely in black (shirt and pants). In focusing on the assigned task the ob-
servers visually blocked out anything that did not fit the criteria. As a result, the 
observers failed to see the gorilla. The use of “eye-tracking recordings” re-
vealed “that many observers did not notice the gorilla even when they were 
looking directly at it.”77 That is an extremely powerful tool—and focus—
within the human mind. 
Although research into the phenomenon of intentional blindness has been 
designed to study the cognitive cause and effect, it is easy to see how the use of 
specific instructions directs the focus of the observer.78 This can also manifest 
itself in the courtroom setting. 
Directing the focus of a witness may impact a trial: 
                                                        
71  Irvin Rock et al., Perception Without Attention: Results of a New Method, 24 COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 502, 502 (1992). 
72  Christopher Chabris & Daniel Simons, Gorilla Experiment, INVISIBLE GORILLA (2010), 
http://www.theinvisiblegorilla.com/gorilla_experiment.html. 
73  Id.  
74  Id. 
75  Stephen L. Macknik et al., Attention and Awareness in Stage Magic: Turning Tricks into 
Research, 9 NATURE REVS.: NEUROSCIENCE 871, 873 (2008). 
76  Id.  
77  Id. 
78  Beckman, supra note 44, at 25. 
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At times the brain can “fill[] in gaps—making assumptions . . . and mistaking 
them for facts.” Witnesses are frequently asked to review video recordings, au-
dio recordings, computer generated reenactments, and the like. At trial an attor-
ney, much like [the magician] Teller describes “a good conjuror . . . could poten-
tially exploit the human compulsion to find patterns, and to impose them when 
they aren’t really there.” Specific instructions may lead to inattentional blind-
ness thereby impacting the responses of witnesses. So too, when focusing the at-
tention of the fact finder, be she judge or juror, inattentional blindness may im-
pact their perception of the event in question. In this regard, trial advocacy may 
be much like Teller defines magic: “[t]he theatrical linking of a cause with an ef-
fect that has no basis in physical reality, but that—in our hearts—ought to.”79 
ACT III: MISINFORMATION 
No matter how big the lie, repeat it often enough and 
the masses will regard it as the truth.—John F. Kennedy 
As used by magicians, misinformation often means deception. As used by 
attorneys, misinformation usually does not mean intentional deception. Rather, 
misinformation is often used to create doubt and, on occasion, may be the result 
of unintentional deception. Testimony elicited from a witness is usually intend-
ed to obtain either an opinion or the recollection of an event or events. Fre-
quently, the recollections are partially, substantially, or completely wrong. In 
addition to the reasons already discussed, additional factors may result in incor-
rect recollections that include inaccurate information, false memories, and a 
lack of shared meaning. 
A. Inaccurate Input 
In the context of a courtroom, inaccurate information means that a recollec-
tion was influenced, in part, on having been provided inaccurate information 
(inaccurate input). A study from 197580 examining this concept sought to de-
termine whether the suggestion of false information would influence recollec-
tions of an event. The first experiment used questions about a short film that 
                                                        
79  Id. (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting George Johnson, The Science of 
Magic, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at F1). 
80  Elizabeth F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 560 (1975). The abstract provides that: 
A total of 490 subjects, in four experiments, saw films of complex, fast-moving events, 
such as automobile accidents or classroom disruptions. The purpose of these experiments was to 
investigate how the wording of questions asked immediately after an event may influence re-
sponses to questions asked considerably later. It is shown that when the initial question contains 
either true presuppositions (e.g., it postulates the existence of an object that did exist in the sce-
ne) or false presuppositions (e.g., postulates the existence of an object that did not exist), the 
likelihood is increased that subjects will later report having seen the presupposed object. The re-
sults suggest that questions asked immediately after an event can introduce new—not necessari-
ly correct—information, which is then added to the memorial representation of the event, there-
by causing its reconstruction or alteration. 
Id. at 560. 
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included objects that did not exist. Subjects were asked one of two possible 
questions: 
Question 1: How fast was Car A going when it ran the stop sign? 
Question 2: How fast was Car A going when it turned right?81 
The point of the question was to determine the estimated speed of the car. 
The phantom object was the stop sign referenced in the question. The first 
question presumes the existence of a stop sign; the second question makes no 
reference to any such object. Half of the subjects received the first variant of 
the question and the other half the second variant. In a subsequent question, one 
hundred percent of the participants were asked “Did you see a stop sign for Car 
A?”82 Fifty-three percent of the participants receiving the question that con-
tained a reference to the stop sign answered “yes” to the question of whether or 
not there was a stop sign while only 35 percent of the participants receiving the 
question that did not reference the stop sign answered “yes.”83 The difference 
of 18 percent is statistically significant.84 
It was concluded that “[t]he wording of a presupposition into a question 
about an event, asked immediately after that event has taken place, can influ-
ence the answer to a subsequent question concerning the presupposition itself, 
asked a very short time later, in the direction of conforming with the supplied 
information.”85 In that particular experiment the existence of the stop sign was, 
in fact, true. 
Loftus offers two theories to explain the result: 
The first is that when a subject answers the initial stop sign question, he some-
how reviews, or strengthens, or in some sense makes more available certain 
memory representations corresponding to the stop sign. Later, when asked, “Did 
you see a stop sign . . . ?”, he responds on the basis of the strengthened memori-
al representation.86 
Loftus’ second theory she refers to as “construction hypothesis.”87 When 
answering the initial question with the presupposition of a stop sign, Loftus hy-
pothesizes that the subject 
“visualize[s]” or “reconstruct[s]” in his mind that portion of the incident needed 
to answer the question, and so, if he accepts the presupposition, he introduces a 
stop sign into his visualization whether or not it was in memory. When interro-
gated later about the existence of the stop sign, he responds on the basis of his 
                                                        
81  Id. at 564. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
84  Significant at p < .05. “Statistically significant” means that the result is unlikely to have 
occurred by pure chance. In this case, according to Loftus, there is a less than 5 percent 
chance that the result was by pure chance. Id. 
85  Id. Although it may not impact Loftus’ conclusion, it is important to note that Experiment 
1 was conducted as a ten-item paper questionnaire as opposed to oral interrogation. Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
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earlier supplementation of the actual incident. In other words, the subject may 
“see” the stop sign that he has himself constructed. This would not tend to hap-
pen when the initial question refers only to the right turn.88 
In describing the significance of this hypothesis, Loftus notes that: “If a 
piece of true information supplied to the subject after the accident augments his 
memory, then, in a similar way, it should be possible to introduce into memory 
something that was not in fact in the scene, by supplying a piece of false infor-
mation.”89 Loftus did not attempt to replicate this particular experiment without 
a stop sign present. However, a year before, Loftus and Palmer conducted a dif-
ferent experiment in which false information was interjected into the questions. 
In that prior experiment, subjects were shown a film of a car accident.90 
Subjects were then asked questions on two separate occasions by means of a 
written questionnaire.91 The first set of questions was administered immediately 
after viewing the film while the second set was administered approximately one 
week later.92 
The first set of questions asked the subjects about their observation of the 
speed of a vehicle involved in a collision.93 This set of questions used either the 
verb smashed or the verb hit with respect to the collision between the vehicles. 
A week later, the second set of questions was administered. They were not 
permitted to view the film a second time. Subjects were asked, “Did you see 
any broken glass?” and were required to check a box indicating either “yes” or 
“no.”94 
There was no broken glass represented in the film. The hypothesis was that 
“since broken glass is commensurate with accidents occurring at high speed . . . 
the subjects who had been asked the smashed question might more often say 
‘yes’ ” to the test question.95 
The experiment yielded statistically significant results. With regard to the 
question of speed of the vehicles, subjects questioned using the verb smashed 
estimated vehicular speeds greater than those subjects in which the verb hit was 
used.96 With regard to the second set of questions, subjects who were ques-
tioned with the verb smashed were significantly more likely to answer yes to 
the question “Did you see any broken glass?”97 
The tests resulted, in effect, in the creation of false memories—the belief 
that something existed or occurred when it did not, in fact, exist or occur. 
                                                        
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Loftus & Palmer, supra note 54, at 587. 
91  Id. The film lasted less than one minute and the accident lasted four seconds. Id. 
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
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B. False Memories 
To understand the concept of false memories, one must look at the research 
on how memory works. It has been suggested that “memory is a veridical98 
record of our past.”99 There are numerous theories, studies, writings, infor-
mation, and misinformation about memories and recall. The only certainty is 
that there is much uncertainty. Nevertheless, there are some facts that are sub-
stantially supported by research. One is that we forget.100 Another is that our 
memory process is somewhat cyclical. That is, “[w]e go without thinking about 
something for a while, then we remember it again, then go without thinking 
about it, then remember it yet again.”101 There are times when you may re-
member more, or less about an event.102 The widely held belief that certain 
memories are highly susceptible to repression is not as accurate as it once was 
thought to be.103 
Studies are difficult, if not impossible, to conduct regarding certain allega-
tions of repressed memories.104 There are, however, anecdotal cases that illus-
trate with some clarity how certain memories, however real they might seem 
and however strongly they are believed to be accurate by the person recalling 
                                                        
98  In this case the authors intend veridical to mean “corresponding to facts; not illusory;  
real; actual; genuine.” Veridical, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse 
/veridical (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
99  Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Repressed and Recovered Memory, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 177, 178 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske 
eds., 2008). 
100  According to Loftus et al.: 
There are simple explanations for everyday forgetting. One hypothesis is that unrehearsed 
information tends to decay more than rehearsed information. Another hypothesis is that some 
experiences are encoded inadequately to begin with, or some other experience interferers with 
the memory consolidation process. Despite these perfectly good (and well-documented) expla-
nations for ordinary forgetting, there is still a widespread belief that forgetting means something 
sinister. Take, for just one example, a national memory survey in the US with over 1,500 re-
spondents. People of all ages and educational backgrounds often said that when people have 
“spotty” memories, it is usually a sign that something traumatic has happened to them. 
Id. at 180. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. at 181. However, Loftus et al. note: 
It is extremely difficult to study the mechanism of repression in the controlled conditions 
of the laboratory. The net result of this difficulty is that much of the popular speculation regard-
ing repressed and recovered memory has emerged in the course of clinical practice rather than as 
a result of empirical research. That is, the “reality” of repressed and recovered memory has been 
based primarily on clinical intuition rather than on data. For obvious reasons, empirical research 
on this issue has been practically and ethically difficult to conduct. In order to find genuine evi-
dence that these phenomenon exist we would have to meet two criteria. First, we would have to 
obtain verifiable evidence that the target event took place; second, we would have to obtain veri-
fiable evidence that the memory of the event had been inaccessible for some period of time and 
then that it was subsequently recovered by a process beyond ordinary forgetting and remember-
ing. 
Id. 
104  See id. 
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the event or events, appear to be completely false. Consider the case of psy-
chiatrist David Corwin. 
In 1997 psychiatrist David Corwin and a colleague published a case history 
that was viewed by many as proof of a recovered memory. Corwin interviewed 
Jane Doe . . . when she was five years old . . . . Jane’s . . . parents were in the 
middle of a bitter custody dispute. [The Mother was accused] of sexually and 
physically abusing Jane . . . . Corwin met with . . . Jane . . . [and] Jane told Cor-
win specific details of abuse at the hands of her mother: She “rubs her finger up 
my vagina” in the bathtub, and did so “more than twenty times . . . probably 
ninety-nine times.” Jane also told Corwin that her mother had burned her feet 
(Corwin concludes Jane was burned on a kitchen stove coil). Jane’s mother lost 
both custody and visitation rights. 
Eleven years later, when Corwin spoke to Jane . . . , the grownup Jane 
asked to see [the taped interviews]. Although she remembered what she had told 
Corwin many years earlier, Jane said she was not sure whether what she said 
was really true. Corwin met with her, and videotaped their session. When he 
asked Jane if she remembered anything about possible sexual abuse, she said: 
“No. I mean, I remember that was part of the accusation, but I don’t remember 
anything—wait a minute, yeah, I do.” Almost immediately, Jane described an 
abusive episode in the bathtub, one that . . . was different from what she had re-
ported [eleven] years earlier. Nonetheless, the case of Jane Doe came to be seen 
as compelling evidence of a repressed and recovered memory. 
But [two researchers] were more sceptical. When they dug into the facts of 
the case, they discovered that there was never any objective corroborating evi-
dence of Jane’s alleged abuse, nor was there any evidence that she had repressed 
the allegations. There was, however, a nasty custody battle that Jane’s stepmoth-
er said they won because of the “sexual angle.” And the burned feet? Well, not 
only did Jane’s mother not have a stove with coils, but Jane had a hereditary 
fungal condition that could have caused what looked like a healing burn wound. 
Furthermore, there was also no evidence that Jane had ever forgotten the allega-
tions of abuse. In fact, both her foster mother and her stepmother reported that 
Jane talked about these events frequently. At the end of this ordeal what we are 
left with is a videotape of a young woman’s emotional reaction to herself as a 
child reporting an experience with detail, sincerity, and emotion. Yet none of 
these factors are related to the accuracy of the original allegations and provide 
no empirical support for the phenomenon of repressed and recovered memory.105 
Though the seriousness of the allegations is not to be taken lightly, if the 
events in question did not, in fact, occur, the consequences are serious. A 
mother who was deprived of a meaningful relationship with her daughter and 
the untold consequences to the daughter’s mental state with memories that may 
be less than accurate are only a tip of the iceberg.106 
False memories are particularly relevant to the trial lawyer. As mentioned 
above, much of what lawyers do is posing questions that seek the recall of in-
                                                        
105  Id. at 182–83 (citations omitted). 
106  A thorough discussion of the consequences relating to false allegations exceeds the scope 
of this article. 
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formation. If that recall is inaccurate, the results may have a profound impact 
on the parties. 
False memories are not limited to traumatic events. Many people can de-
scribe former events with particular accuracy only to find out, at a later time, 
that the memory contained false information. Another way to examine this 
phenomenon is to take a look at how supposedly repressed memories are sub-
sequently recovered. When recovered memories are found to be false, then all 
memories recovered in the same manner become suspect.107 One study con-
firmed this concern. 
In the mid-1990s, two researchers sought to prove whether or not “it was [] 
possible for subjects to create a coherent and detailed memory for something 
they never did.”108 
They recruited people in pairs . . . belong[ing] to the same family. One family 
member became a confederate, whose job it was to tell the experimenters about 
some real events that the other family member—who became the subject—had 
experienced during childhood. . . . The confederate helped the experimenters 
create a description of the false event, supplying them with idiosyncratic details 
about which shopping mall, who was at the mall, and so on. . . . [T]he main fea-
tures of the false event were always the same: The subject became lost, and was 
eventually found by an elderly lady who helped reunite the family.109 
“By the end of the study, approximately one quarter of the subjects had 
created a partial or full false memory of being lost in the mall as a child.”110 
Many subjects did not believe the memory was false even after being told the 
purpose of the study.111 
This, as well as many other studies, support the hypothesis that completely 
false memories could be implanted into a person’s memory with the person ful-
ly believing the memory to be real.112 How does this translate into the court-
room? Substantial research supports the hypothesis that simple techniques can 
effectively implant false memories.113 As a result, it becomes harder and harder 
to gain the actual truth at a contested proceeding. 
C. Lack of Shared Meaning 
Another factor that may lead to misinformation is a lack of a shared mean-
ing. Shared meaning is the idea that a word, phrase or concept may share mul-
tiple meanings. Those meanings may vary from person to person. As a result, 
when you use one of those words with a person, that individual might think you 
mean one thing when you, in fact, mean something entirely different. What 
                                                        
107  Loftus et al., supra note 99, at 184. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. at 185. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 186. 
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some might consider a simple word, phrase, or concept may have significantly 
disparate meanings from one person to another or one culture to another. 
For example, consider the phrase “smoking cigarettes.” People have inter-
preted “smoking cigarettes as anything from (a) taking even a single puff to (b) 
cigarettes they have finished, and from (c) cigarettes they have borrowed to (d) 
only those they have bought. Fully 10 [percent] of answers changed from yes to 
no, or no to yes, when given a standard definition of what counts as smoking a 
cigarette.”114 
Kellerman has noted how individual words may hold different meanings to 
different people. “You” could mean “just me or also my family;”115 “weekday” 
might, or might not, include Saturday.116 Evaluative words, such as “not quite” 
and “slightly” have also shown to be problematic in that they mean different 
things to different people.117 Noting that certain words, such as “lots, almost all, 
virtually all, nearly all, a majority of, not very many, almost none, hardly any, a 
couple, [and] a few” generally are interpreted similarly among individuals, oth-
er words such as “most, numerous, large proportion of, significant number of, 
considerable number of, [and] several” have shown to have highly variable 
meanings.118 
Lawyers using words with variable meanings to different people can signif-
icantly impact trial testimony. Take, for example, the question “Do you drink?” 
Suppose a witness answers no. To him, the question might have meant on a 
regular (another troubling word) basis. But to the lawyer, the question more 
precisely might have been “Do you ever drink?” Given the witness’s answer, 
the lawyer may offer evidence of an occasion when the witness had a glass of 
wine with dinner. Was the witness being untruthful? Can the lawyer paint him 
that way? As a result, is the witness’s integrity now in question? 
D. Safeguards 
Although there is the potential for a trial to be rife with misinformation, 
there are mechanisms in place that attempt to provide safeguards for the judi-
cial system which seek to help gain the actual truth. At the trial court level, the 
starting point of these safeguards is found in the Rules of Evidence.119 
                                                        
114  KELLERMANN, supra note 33, at 4. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  This article focuses specifically on the Federal Rules of Evidence and, particularly, on 
Federal Rule of Evidence 611 with regard to leading questions.  Supplement Table S1, at 
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj/vol15/iss2/11/, provides a chart for each state and territory 
that reflects—to the extent it exists—an equivalent rule for that respective state and territory. 
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INTERMISSION: THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Know the rules well, so you can break them effectively.—Dalai Lama XIV 
Generally, questions articulated by a lawyer on the same side of the case as 
the witness are not supposed to suggest the answer (a leading question). Con-
versely, questions posed by a lawyer on the opposite side of the case as the wit-
ness may suggest the answer. Although some questions are easily identified as 
leading or not (for example, “The light was red when you ran through the inter-
section, was it not?”), others are more challenging. 
Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 611120 governs questions that suggest 
answers in terms of “leading questions.” The Rule provides, in relevant part, 
that “[l]eading questions should not be used on direct examination except as 
necessary to develop the witness’s testimony. Ordinarily, the court should al-
low leading questions: (1) on cross-examination; and (2) when a party calls a 
hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse par-
ty.”121 
Is the following a leading question? “How tall was the bank robber?” It is 
likely that most trial lawyers and judges would tell you that it is not a leading 
question but is, rather, a neutral question. It may, in fact, be more than meets 
the eye. But how is a leading question defined and, more to the point, is a ques-
tion such as “How tall was the bank robber?” a leading question? 
Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor state rules define a leading ques-
tion. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a leading question as “[a] question that 
suggests the answer to the person being interrogated.”122 Few would argue that 
a question that asks “How tall was the bank robber?” suggests, in any way, the 
answer. If we reframe the question in this way: “Would you say the bank rob-
ber was about six feet tall?” then we have, clearly, suggested an answer thereby 
creating a leading question; one that is potentially governed by FRE 611. What 
about this variant? “Would you say the bank robber was taller than six feet?” 
Here the witness is given parameters, but parameters that may be rejected. She 
could easily say “no.” What if the variant were a little more unusual? “How 
short was the bank robber?” This question might seem to be virtually identical 
to the original question, merely substituting the adjective short for the adjective 
tall. 
A choice of adjectives in the above examples does not—in either case—
suggest the answer. That is to say, using the adjective tall does not, unlike spe-
cific references to height, provide guidance to the responding party as to what 
height the interrogator is seeking. Nor, presumably, does the adjective short 
                                                        
120  All states except New York have enacted a rule that is similar, and in some cases identi-
cal, to Federal Rule 611(c). See Supplement Table S1, at http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nlj 
/vol15/iss2/11/, for a complete list of rules for each state that are similar to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 611(c). 
121  FED. R. EVID. 611(c). 
122  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 39. 
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provide such guidance. Therefore, by the strictest definition, the questions 
would not, in the truest sense, be objectionable based on an FRE 611 leading 
objection. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 611 is the primary rule on point with respect to 
the permissibility of leading questions. Other rules, however, provide tools to 
assist the court in dealing with potential misleading and prohibitive questions. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 specifically permits the court to exclude “rele-
vant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of 
one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading 
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evi-
dence.”123 Of note is the portion of the rule that permits the court to exclude ev-
idence that may mislead the jury. That is, any evidence, which, in the opinion 
of the judge, might mislead the jury, may be excluded. This permits the judge 
to help filter evidence that may have been elicited through creative questioning 
using the techniques referenced in this article. The balancing test, however, is 
that to exclude such evidence the court must find that the “probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger”124 of one of the factors delineated in the 
rule. 
Finally,125 because witnesses are often questioned about a writing, a re-
cording, or a deposition, there are times that one party may believe that the side 
posing the questions may be taking a statement out of context unfairly. In order 
to alleviate this concern, Federal Rule of Evidence 106 permits a court to admit 
any other part of such writing or recorded statement if “in fairness [it] ought to 
be considered at the same time.”126 
Although the rules are tools—used by judges and lawyers alike to assist the 
fact finder in reaching a result—they are in many cases subordinate to an effec-
tive lawyer who can use non-rule related tools to impact his or her case. One 
such tool is the connection lawyers make with the fact finder. 
ACT IV: DIGGING DEEPER 
The conjurer demonstrates that things are not always what they seem. 
Therein lies his philosophy.—Joseph Stoddart (a.k.a. Colonel Stodare) 
Steinmeyer suggests that “[w]hen magicians are good at their jobs, it is be-
cause they anticipate the way an audience thinks.”127 Certainly, the same can be 
true of trial lawyers who anticipate the way the fact finder thinks. Expounding 
further, magicians “are able to suggest a series of clues that guide the audience 
                                                        
123  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
124  Id. (emphasis added). 
125  Other rules may impact various concepts of fairness, truthfulness, et cetera, such as the 
veracity of a witness and character evidence. However, a thorough discussion of those rules 
exceeds the scope of this article. 
126  FED. R. EVID. 106. 
127  STEINMEYER, supra note 21, at 117. 
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. . . . [T]hey depend on the audience’s bringing something to the table—
preconceptions or assumptions that can be naturally exploited.”128 Lawyers rely 
on the same thing. However, instead of using magical props, lawyers use 
words. Seemingly innocent questions, such as one inquiring about a person’s 
height, may not be so innocent after all. The way in which “a question is 
phrased has profound effects on the accuracy . . . of . . . testimony.”129 This ar-
ticle has already discussed how words can, and will, in different contexts im-
pact answers that may be given to carefully crafted questions. In this section, 
greater depth is explored on how words may impact responses with regard to 
the use of verbs, adjectives, adverbs, definite and indefinite articles, and 
phrases. 
A. Verb Choice 
In 1974, a study was conducted to investigate whether “the phrasing of the 
question used to elicit the speed judgment” would impact the answer.”130 The 
subjects who participated in the study were shown films that depicted a traffic 
accident.131 Subsequently, the subjects had to respond to written questions, one 
of which inquired “about the speed of the vehicles” in the film.132 Subjects 
were divided into groups and each group was prompted with a question using a 
different verb to describe the collision. The verbs tested were as follows: 
smashed, collided, bumped, hit, and contacted.133 The control word, or neutral 
word, appeared to be “hit.”134 Seven different films were shown to different 
groups in an effort to replicate results with different input.135 The results may 
seem surprising. Words that implicated higher speeds resulted in higher esti-
mates. 
                                                        
128  Id. 
129  Jack P. Lipton, On the Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 90, 
94 (1977). This particular study had the narrow focus of eyewitness testimony as opposed to 
the broader view of merely recollection. In this particular study: 
Various aspects of eyewitness testimony were investigated in a simulated courtroom set-
ting. Eighty subjects were shown a filmed murder and then testified about their observations in 
one of several experimental conditions. Testimony was rated for accuracy and quantity. Signifi-
cant main effects were found for . . . immediacy of testimony (immediately or after a [one]-week 
delay), testimony structure (unstructured free recall or response to questions), question type 
(open-ended, leading, and multiple choice), and question bias (positive, negative, and neutral). 
Id. at 90. 
130  Loftus & Palmer, supra note 54. 
131  Id. at 586. 
132  Id. Presumably the use of written, as opposed to oral, questions eliminates variables such 
as voice inflection, tone, and speed, which arguably could influence an answer. By eliminat-
ing such variables, the researcher may focus on and appropriately analyze the issue being 
examined. 
133  Id. 
134  See id. 
135  Id. 
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The control verb of “hit” resulted in an 
estimated speed of thirty-four miles per 
hour.137 The verb “smashed” resulted in an 
average speed that was 19 percent higher at 
40.5 miles per hour.138 Table 2 reflects the 
results of the study. 
Loftus and Palmer concluded that 
“[t]he results of this experiment indicate 
that the form of a question (in this case, 
changes in a single word) can markedly and 
systematically affect a witness’s answer to that question.”139 The researchers 
noted that the actual speed of the vehicles played little part in the subjects’ es-
timation of speed but the “phrasing of the question controlled considerable var-
iance.”140 
A subsequent experiment was performed, which evaluated, in part, how 
time and question phrasing impacted recall. Part of that investigation offered a 
slight variation of the above experiment. In this subsequent test, subjects were 
asked about speed with either the use of the word “hit” or “smashed.”141 Again, 
a statistically significant difference was found between the responses based on 
the wording of the question.142 
B. Adjectives and Adverbs 
In an unpublished study, Loftus interviewed forty people about their head-
aches.143 Loftus found a statistical significance in the difference between an-
swers based on the questions posed. For example, individuals reported more 
headaches when asked about the number of frequent headaches versus the 
number of occasional headaches.144 
These results have been replicated in varying contexts. In the study con-
ducted by Southeastern Louisiana University, the adjectives used in the phras-
ing of a question were examined.145 The participants were asked to estimate the 
                                                        
136  Id. at 586 tbl.1. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
139  Id. at 586. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 587. 
142  Id. Loftus and Palmer offer an opinion as to why the different words result in different 
responses. Those opinions, while interesting, exceed the scope of this article. 
143  Loftus, supra note 80, at 561. It should be noted that the details of the study were not 
reported and this author makes no representation as to whether a group of forty subjects is 
enough for reliability. Nevertheless, the study does provide useful data for the dialogue pre-
sented in this article. 
144  Id.  
145  See generally Thomas J. Lipscomb et al., Bias in Eyewitness Accounts: The Effects of 
Question Format, Delay Interval, and Stimulus Presentation, 119 J. PSYCHOL. 207 (1985). In 
TABLE 2: AVERAGE ESTIMATES OF 
VEHICLE SPEED, BASED ON 
PROMPTING VERB
136 
Verb Speed (MPH) 
Contacted 31.8 
Hit 34.0 
Bumped 38.1 
Collided 39.3 
Smashed 40.5 
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speed of the cars involved in a collision.146 Half of the participants were inter-
rogated using the adverb “fast,” as in “How fast was the car traveling?” versus 
the adverb “slow,” as in “How slow was the car traveling?”147 The hypothesis 
being that the use of the adverb “slow” would impact the value of the response 
by being suggestive in nature: i.e., the car must have been traveling at a slower 
speed than that which might have been otherwise perceived.148 Table 3 reflects 
a few of the findings from the study. 
TABLE 3: AVERAGE STUDY RESPONSES, BASED ON PROMPTING MODIFIERS149 
Question Modifier 
Average 
Response 
How ___ was Car 1 going? (mph) Fast 
Slow 
36.20 
27.50 
How ___ was Car 2 going? (mph) Fast 
Slow 
39.76 
35.25 
How ___ damage was done to Car 1? Much 
Little 
     6.27150 
 5.40 
How ___ were the skid marks made by Car 1? Long 
Short 
    5.04151 
3.88 
How ___ noise occurred as a result of the accident? Much 
Little 
    7.44152 
6.52 
The results support the hypothesis: 
Estimations of the speed of both cars were significantly greater when the un-
marked adverb fast was employed as compared to the marked adverb slow. Sim-
ilarly, estimates of the extent of damage, skidding, noise, and harm to occupants 
were all significantly greater when the relevant questions were phrased with 
unmarked . . . adverbs.153 
                                                                                                                                
this study, 180 students (ninety males and ninety females) were recruited from introductory 
psychology classes. Id. at 209. The subjects viewed “three representations of an automobile 
accident.” Id. The sequence showed a collision between two vehicles at an intersection. Id. 
Subsequently, a close-up view of both vehicles was shown. Id. With regard to the portion of 
the experiment that tested changes in phrasing, words were substituted with marked or un-
marked descriptors: fast versus slow. Id. 
146  Id. at 209. 
147  Id. 
148  See id. at 208–09. 
149  Id. at 210 tbl.1. 
150  “Values could range from 1 to 11” on a likert scale. Id. at 210 tbl.1 n.c. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. at 209–10 (internal cross-references omitted). For an explanation of “marked” and 
“unmarked” modifiers, see infra text accompanying notes 158–160. 
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In a recent study of over one thousand people154 that examined the wording 
of a question, Jay Olson found that “the exact wording of the question seemed 
to influence” the decisions made by the responders.155 Simply changing a single 
word in the directive, “name a card” versus “visualize a card,” impacted the re-
sponses.156 
A different approach was taken in a study that examined the use of what 
the researcher called “marked” and “unmarked” adjectives and adverbs.157 An 
“unmarked” word was one that had “a nominal or neutral use that refers to the 
whole dimension.”158 These were compared with the marked words, which had 
a lower bound of zero.159 For example, the names of dimensions such as “high” 
versus “low” were used in questions such as “How high is the building?” 
(which would have an answer that is potentially unlimited) versus “How low is 
the building?” (which would have an answer that is limited to zero).160 In this 
study, subjects were asked to make numerical guesses to questions that con-
tained either marked or unmarked words.161 The hypothesis being tested was 
that the use of these marked modifiers would impact responses to a statistically 
significant factor in the direction of the marking, while use of unmarked modi-
fiers would not.162 
Using the example of the height of the building, in the context of the hy-
pothesis, the question “How high was the building?” should yield answers un-
influenced by the question, while the question “How low was the building?” 
would “presuppose that the building is low.”163 In this study, subjects were told 
that “the experiment was a study in the accuracy of guessing measurements and 
                                                        
154  Jay Olson, Revealing the Psychology of Playing Card Magic, SCI. AM. (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/revealing-psychology-playing-card-magic/. In this 
study, Jay Olson and two other researchers conducted an experiment and 
applied well-known techniques from vision science to measure how well people see, remember, 
like, and choose each of the [fifty-two] cards in a standard [American] deck. . . . To measure 
choice, . . .  asked over a thousand people to either name or visualize a card, then recorded their 
selections. 
Id. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. (“When asked to name a card, over half of the people chose one of four cards: the 
Ace of Spades (25%), or the Queen (14%), Ace (6%), or King (6%) of Hearts. . . . But when 
asked to visualize a card, people seemed to choose the Ace of Hearts more often. In [the] 
sample, they chose it almost twice as often when asked to visualize (11%) rather than name 
(6%) a card.”). 
157  Richard J. Harris, Answering Questions Containing Marked and Unmarked Adjectives 
and Adverbs, 97 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 399, 399 (1973). 
158  Id. 
159  Id. 
160  Id. Although not addressed in the study, arguably even use of the question “How high is 
the building?” is not as neutral as “What is the height of the building?” Nevertheless, Harris 
presumed that use of the word “low” presents an, although unmentioned, upward boundary. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. 
163  Id. 
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that they should make as intelligent a numerical guess as possible to each ques-
tion.”164 
Look at the question, “How tall was the man running through the alley?” 
Might an answer be manipulated by phrasing the question “How short was the 
man running through the alley?” 
Table 4 reflects a select few of the test questions used by Harris, the 
marked and unmarked modifiers, and the average estimates by the subjects. 
TABLE 4: AVERAGE STUDY RESPONSES, BASED ON PROMPTING MODIFIERS165 
Question (Units of Measure) Modifier166 
Average 
Response 
How ___ time did the man have between planes? 
(min., hr.) 
Much 
Little 
73.2 min 
37.5 min 
How ___ money was in the man’s wallet? ($, ¢) Much 
Little 
$4.90 
$3.96 
How ___ was the set of weights? (lb.) Heavy 
Light 
146.3 lb. 
56.3 lb. 
How ___ was the quarterback? (lb.) Heavy 
Light 
185 lb. 
180 lb. 
How ___ was the office building? (stories) High 
Low 
26.2 stories 
13.1 stories 
How ___ was the plane flying? (ft. off ground) High 
Low 
8,907 ft. 
4,481 ft. 
The results support the hypothesis that “answers to unmarked-modifier 
questions cover a wider range than answers to marked-modifier questions.”167 
The table reflects, in some cases, enormous variances in responses.168 For ex-
ample, a difference of ninety pounds in response to the questions of “How 
                                                        
164  Id. at 401. The methodology of the experiment was that the examiner: 
[R]ead a list of [thirty-two] questions and [the subject] wrote a numerical answer for each. The 
[examiner] read each question once, told [the subjects] the unit(s) of measure to be used in their 
answers, and then repeated the question. Each group of [subjects] received the same [thirty-two]  
question frames in a different random order. Items were counterbalanced such that each [subject] 
heard every question frame and adjective or adverb once and only once, with half of the [sub-
jects] hearing the unmarked member in a given question frame and half hearing the marked 
member. 
Id. 
165  Id. at 400 tbl.1. 
166  Id. The top word is the unmarked word while the bottom word is the marked word. 
167  Id. at 401. Harris notes: 
Prior to figuring the statistics, the numerically largest score in each of the [sixty-four] distribu-
tions was eliminated, since there were several distributions with one very extreme, though not 
logically impossible, score, whose inclusion in the sample made the variance meaningless. In 
addition, three other single scores in three different distributions were eliminated for unintelligi-
bility or [the subject’s] obvious misunderstanding of the question. 
Id. 
168  See id. at 400–01. 
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heavy were the weights?” versus “How light were the weights?”169 The results 
clearly indicate that “the wording of a question may affect the answer.”170 
Loftus notes that in the context of both “past personal experiences and re-
cently-witnessed events” that the wording of questions may impact answers.171 
Even seemingly minor changes in wording may influence an answer. An inter-
rogator need not be as overt as using language such as “tall” or “short,” “high” 
or “low.” In fact, the use of definite or indefinite articles may impact an an-
swer.172 
C. Definite and Indefinite Articles 
Use of the word “a” does not necessarily presume the existence of an ob-
ject.173 For example, the question “Did you see a broken headlight?” does not 
presume the existence of a broken headlight.174 However, use of the definite 
article does: “Did you see the broken headlight?”175 In the former, the inquiry is 
whether one existed or not. This assumes the responder would see it if, in fact, 
it existed. In the latter, the inquiry is wholly different. In that case, the assump-
tion is that the headlight existed and the inquiry is whether or not the responder 
saw the headlight. 
The significance in the inquiry is whether or not the use of the definite arti-
cle as opposed to the indefinite article would alter a response. The results of a 
study in which this hypothesis was tested supports the proposition that it 
does.176 
In that study, Loftus and Zanni found that “very small changes in the word-
ing of a question” will influence responses.177 In two experiments, “subjects 
viewed a film of an automobile accident” and were subsequently asked ques-
tions about what they saw.178 For some of the questions, the definite article 
“the” was used, while in others, the indefinite article “a” was used.179 Previous 
literature had been divided in their conclusions.180 
                                                        
169  Id. at 400 tbl.1. 
170  Loftus, supra note 80, at 561. 
171  Id. 
172  See id. at 562. 
173  Id. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. (emphasis added). 
176  Elizabeth F. Loftus & Guido Zanni, Eyewitness Testimony: The Influence of the Wording 
of a Question, 5 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 86 (1975). 
177  Id. at 86. 
178  Id. 
179  Id. 
180  Id. Loftus and Zanni report that “Muscio (1915) concluded that the more reliable form of 
question was one that did not use the definite article, whereas Burtt (1931) reported that a 
and the are about equally suggestive.” Id. 
Spring 2015] MAGICIAN TECHNIQUES USED AT TRIAL 665 
Loftus and Zanni note that implicit in the question “Did you see a broken 
headlight?” are two questions.181 First, was there a broken headlight and, sec-
ond, if there was a broken headlight, did you see it.182 This logic dictates that if 
the responding party decides that, in fact, there was a broken headlight, then he 
or she should be fairly certain of his or her response to the second implicit 
question.183 The researchers concluded that “[t]he problem that arises for a sub-
ject is that filmed accidents occur in the space of seconds,” much like the reali-
ty of eye-witness testimony, “making it nearly impossible to be certain of [the 
first question, thereby resulting in a response of] ‘don’t know’ much of the 
time.”184 
Contrasting this scenario with use of the definite article creates a wholly 
different inferential chain. When the question is phrased with the use of the def-
inite article: “Did you see the broken headlight?” the first question referenced 
above—was there a broken headlight?—is completely eliminated.185 Loftus 
and Zanni hypothesized that fewer “don’t know” responses would result when 
the definite article was utilized.186 
In the experiment, the subjects were informed “that they were participating 
in an experiment on memory and that they would be shown a short film” and 
subsequently asked to complete a questionnaire about the film.187 Three ques-
tions inquired about objects present in the film and three questions inquired 
about objects not present in the film.188 
The results were significant. Regardless of whether an item was actually 
present in the film, subjects presented with a question using the indefinite arti-
                                                        
181  Id. at 87. 
182  Id. 
183  Id. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. 
186  Id. 
187  Id. The method of the experiment was as follows: 
One hundred graduate students participated in this experiment, in groups of various sizes. 
All subjects were told that they were participating in an experiment on memory and that they 
would be shown a short film followed by a questionnaire. The content of the film was not men-
tioned. 
The film itself depicted a multiple car accident. Specifically, a car makes a right hand turn 
to enter the main stream of traffic; this turn causes the cars in the oncoming traffic to stop sud-
denly, causing a five car bumper to bumper collision. The total time of the film is less than [one] 
min, and the accident itself occurs within a [four]-sec period. 
At the end of the film, the subjects received a questionnaire asking them to first “give an 
account of the accident you have just seen.” When they had completed their accounts, a series of 
specific questions was asked. Six critical questions were embedded in a list totaling [twenty-
two] questions. Half the subjects received critical questions in the form, “Did you see a . . . ?” 
and the other half of the subjects received them in the form, “Did you see the . . . ?” Three of the 
critical questions pertained to items present in the film and three to items not present. Subjects 
were urged to report only what they saw, and did so by checking “yes,” “no,” or “I don’t know.” 
Each subject received a different permutation of the questions. 
Id. 
188  Id. 
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cle “a were over twice as likely to respond ‘I don’t know.’ ”189 On the other 
hand, subjects to whom questions were posed that used the definite article “the 
tended to commit themselves to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response.”190 Table 5 reflects 
“the percentage of ‘yes,’ ‘no,’ and ‘I don’t know’ responses” to whether items 
were, or were not, present in the film:191 
TABLE 5: RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS BASED ON USE OF DIRECT OR  
INDIRECT ARTICLES IN PROMPTING QUESTIONS.192 
 Object Was 
Present in the Film 
Object Was Not 
Present in the Film 
Response 
Choices “the” “a” “the” “a” 
Experiment I 
Yes 17 20 15 7 
No 60 29 72 55 
I don’t know 23 51 13 38 
Experiment II 
Yes 18 15 20 6 
No 62 28 69 56 
I don’t know 20 57 11 38 
The “Object Was Present in the Film” column demonstrates responses to 
the queries when the object about which the question was directed was, in fact, 
present in the film. The right-hand “Object Was Not Present in the Film” col-
umn reflects responses when the object was not present. 
As noted by the researchers, “[a] major finding was that questions contain-
ing an indefinite article led to many more ‘I don’t know’ responses.”193 
When an indefinite article [(“a”)] was contained in a question about an item that 
was not present in the film, “yes” responses occurred 6 [percent] of the time. 
When the definite article [(“the”)] was used, “yes” responses occurred 20 [per-
cent] of the time. “I don’t know” responses occurred, overall, more often when 
the indefinite article was used (47.5 [percent] vs. 15.5 [percent] for the definite 
article).194 
The conclusions support the hypothesis that the words used to form the ques-
tion do, in fact, influence the answer or response. 
                                                        
189  Id. 
190  Id. 
191  Id. at 88. 
192  Id. at 88 tbl.1. 
193  Id. at 88. 
194  Id. 
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The source of this influence may, according to Loftus and Zanni, be the re-
sult of two possible scenarios.195 First, they suggest that the definite article in-
fluences the responding party by producing a bias that favors a “yes” or “no” 
response.196 The second possible explanation they propose “is that the definite 
article leads a subject [(the responding party)] to infer that the object was in 
fact present, causing for some a reconstruction in their original memory for the 
event.”197 
D. Phrases 
Just as descriptions paint pictures in the minds of the listeners, so do ques-
tions that seek a response. As Kassin points out, “[c]arefully chosen words can 
obscure and even alter people’s impressions, as when tax increases are called 
‘revenue enhancements,’ and the strategic defense initiative is referred to as 
‘star wars.’ ”198 
Regardless of the reason, the results of these studies are consistent; the 
wording of the question can, in fact, impact the response. As mentioned earlier, 
the “reality” may be one that is “constructed and negotiated in the court-
room.”199 
ACT V: POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES 
It’s counter to common sense, but common sense is only based 
on a very small subset of the universe.—Ian J. Davenport 
Federal Rule of Evidence 611(c) provides that “[l]eading questions should 
not be used on direct examination except as necessary to develop the witness’s 
testimony. Ordinarily, the court should allow leading questions: (1) on cross-
examination; and (2) when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a 
witness identified with an adverse party.”200 
The Advisory Committee’s Note to FRE 611(c) provides, in part, that 
“[t]he rule continues the traditional view that the suggestive powers of the lead-
ing question are as a general proposition undesirable.”201 
As previously discussed, a leading question is defined as “[a] question that 
suggests the answer to the person being interrogated.”202 Loftus and Zanni 
point out that “[w]hile an attorney can seemingly easily ‘sense’ when to object 
to a leading question asked by another attorney, the definition of leading is a 
                                                        
195  Id. 
196  Id. 
197  Id. 
198  Kassin, supra note 4, at 692. 
199  Danet, supra note 59, at 191. 
200  FED. R. EVID. 611(c). 
201  FED. R. EVID. 611(c) advisory committee’s note. 
202  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 39. 
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long way from being precise. Any complete definition must eventually consider 
the subtle suggestibility that individual words can carry with them.”203 
If the research is accurate, then subtle variations of word choice in the for-
mation of questions may impact and, in fact, manipulate answers.204 The prob-
lem which is not addressed by the current rule but which, arguably, is recog-
nized by the research, is that questions that are designed to manipulate the 
answer do not, in fact, suggest the answer. To ask “How slow was the car trav-
eling?” certainly does not, in any way, suggest a particular answer. Contrast 
this wording with “Would you agree that the car was going less than thirty 
miles an hour?” Wording such as this certainly suggests the answer even 
though the responding party can clearly disagree. The research indicates that a 
question such as “How slow was the car traveling?” will yield a significantly 
different answer than “How fast was the car traveling?” Does the fact that the 
latter will yield an answer that would be different—statistically significantly 
different—than the former, create a problem? 
Few modifications to FRE 611(c) could appropriately impact question 
formation to the point that any suggestibility would be effectively removed. 
However, the Rule might be modified to include a broad definition of a “lead-
ing question.” Such definition might include the use of words that, in the opin-
ion of the court, would substantially impact a response to the point that the ac-
curacy of the response could not be reasonably relied upon. 
To be sure, this definition (as well as any substantially similar definition) 
could be argued to create more problems than it solves. First, it may be argued 
that the floodgate of objections would be opened thereby bogging down trials 
and requiring the judge to rule on many more challenges to questions that may 
or may not be leading as encompassed by the new rule. Second, one might ar-
gue that the proposed wording is too vague. That is, virtually any question 
might substantially impact the answer. 
Recall that Harris presumed that use of the adjective “tall” in a question 
was unmarked—that is, a neutral adjective.205 Specifically, the two questions 
presented were: “How tall was the basketball player?” and “How short was the 
basketball player?”206 
In this case, Harris posited that use of the word “tall” was neutral and use 
of the word “short” imposed a psychological limit on the value thereby impact-
ing, or influencing, the resulting response.207 The data clearly indicates that the 
word variance impacts the response.208 However, one could argue that both 
words are non-neutral. Arguably, the use of the word “tall” might indicate 
greater height. Certainly, paired with “basketball player” this theory is en-
                                                        
203  Loftus & Zanni, supra note 176, at 88. 
204  See id. 
205  Harris, supra note 157, at 399, 400 tbl.1 & n.a. 
206  Id. at 400 tbl.1. 
207  See id. at 399. 
208  Id. at 401. 
Spring 2015] MAGICIAN TECHNIQUES USED AT TRIAL 669 
hanced.209 However, the researchers also used a different context. They also use 
the “short” and “tall” words when questioning about a “bridegroom.”210 How-
ever, the research did not discuss the use of a truly neutral word. A word such 
as “height” would have, ostensibly, eliminated any particular bias or influence 
on the subjects. Compare the original questions with this question: “What was 
the height of the basketball player?” Might this iteration of the question be 
more neutral? 
Unfortunately, without specific research on the use of potentially true-
neutral words, a conclusion cannot be reached. However, a comparison of the 
research and potentially true-neutral words can quickly demonstrate the possi-
bility of a bias or variance based on the research conducted. Table 6, below, is a 
recreation of Table 4 with the addition of potentially true-neutral modifiers and 
questions: 
TABLE 6: AVERAGE STUDY RESPONSES, BASED ON PROMPTING MODIFIERS, WITH 
PROPOSED NEUTRAL QUESTIONS TO AVOID LEADING 
Original Question(Units of Measure) 
and Proposed Neutral Question Modifier211 
How ___ time did the man have between planes? (min., hr.) 
What amount of time did the man have between planes? 
much / little 
amount 
How ___ money was in the man’s wallet? ($, ¢) 
What amount of money was in the man’s wallet? 
much / little 
amount 
How ___ was the set of weights? (lb.) 
What did the weights weigh? or How much did the weights weigh? 
heavy / light 
(none) 
How ___ was the quarterback? (lb.) 
What was the weight of the quarterback? 
heavy / light 
(none) 
How ___ was the office building? (stories) 
What was the height of the office building? 
high / low 
height 
How ___ was the plane flying? (ft. off ground) 
At what altitude was the plane flying? 
high / low 
altitude 
In the first example, the use of the term “amount” is, arguably, more neu-
tral and, therefore, non-suggestive than either “much” or “little.” In the third 
example regarding weights, the sentence could be restructured in a way that 
eliminates adjectives that might be suggestive. 
Practically speaking, a modified rule would be unlikely to have a positive 
impact in achieving neutrality among responders. A more likely approach for 
success would involve both greater research in the context of controlled mock 
adversarial proceedings coupled with the training of responders. Effective train-
                                                        
209  Id. at 400 tbl.1. 
210  Id. 
211  The top pair of words in each row is the marked and unmarked modifiers, while the bot-
tom word is the proposed neutral option. 
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ing212 with regard to techniques used to manipulate, or attempt to manipulate, 
responses might be the most effective mechanism to obtain accurate responses. 
That is, prepare witnesses to be ready for, recognize, and respond appropriately 
to questions crafted in ways that potentially might manipulate a response. The 
result might just be the evolution of a courtroom proceeding reflective of the 
actual facts in issue. 
CURTAIN CALL 
There is no real ending. It’s just the place 
where you stop the story.—Frank Herbert 
Did Jennie, Houdini’s elephant, disappear? What about the Statue of Liber-
ty? The research and accompanying data indicate that the answer is a matter of 
perspective. To the audiences attending Houdini’s show or Copperfield’s ex-
travaganza, the answer is a resounding yes. Of course we know they didn’t dis-
appear—but it is a matter of perspective. Was the defendant driving that Cor-
vette on Hammond Street? If the fact-finder believes it, then the answer is yes; 
even if he wasn’t. 
Many factors influence individuals. Words, actions, connections and con-
text can all influence responses elicited from witnesses in a courtroom setting. 
When words lawyers use in a courtroom to craft questions, make arguments or 
otherwise describe events influence witnesses, ultimately decisions may be im-
pacted. Similarly, the words of a magician impact how the spectator reacts to a 
trick. 
The magician James Randi once said, “[a]llow people to make [an] as-
sumption[] and they will come away absolutely convinced that assumption was 
correct and that it represents fact. It’s not necessarily so.”213 And, as Dr. 
Charles Reichardt noted, to “ ‘interpret answers to questions, you need to know 
exactly how the questions were asked.’ ”214 Dr. Kathy Kellermann concluded 
that “[q]uestions do more than convey and solicit information. Questions put 
words in people’s mouths.”215 
In the most important arena—that of our courts—because words, actions, 
and connections do make a difference, the question becomes how to counter-
mand these phenomena in a meaningful way so that, to the extent possible, the 
truth at trial reflects the actual truth. Some changes to the rules, education of 
trial lawyers to become aware of these tools and the education of witnesses 
might provide some, albeit not necessarily enough, countermeasures. 
                                                        
212  See George Johnson, Sleights of Mind: Science Meets Magic, Playing on What We Think 
We Know, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at F1. 
213  Id. (quoting James Randi). 
214  Reichardt, supra note 69, at 12 (quoted in Beckman, supra note 44, at 30). 
215  KELLERMANN, supra note 33, at 29. 
